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Abstract 
This study investigated how individuals, and narcissists in particular, respond when they 
bring harm to someone they envy, and what they do in response to the harm that they 
caused.  We examined how high versus low levels of responsibility for harming an 
envied person would affect levels of schadenfreude (i.e., pleasure at other’s suffering), 
guilt and prosocial behavior.  We expected that narcissists would display more 
schadenfreude, less guilt, and less prosocial behavior than nonnarcissists, even when they 
were made to feel responsible for the downfall of the person.  Results showed a 
significant relationship between narcissism and schadenfreude, with narcissists 
experiencing more schadenfreude than less narcissistic individuals.  No relationship was 
found between narcissism and guilt or prosocial behavior.  Responsibility did not affect 
schadenfreude, guilt, or prosocial behavior. 
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Introduction 
Over the years, John Knowles’ renowned novel, A Separate Peace, has been a 
staple in many American high school classrooms.  This book tells the story of Gene, an 
intellectually gifted student who becomes best friends with Phineas (aka Finny)—a 
popular, athletically gifted student.  Gene grows jealous of Finny’s natural abilities and 
charm and soon begins to resent and despise him.  While standing on a tree limb with 
Finny, Gene shakes the branches, causing Finny to fall and permanently injure his leg.  
Although the incident is viewed by all (but Gene) to be an accident, Gene begins to feel 
deep guilt over his actions.  He visits Finny, trying to take full blame for the accident, but 
is kept from doing so by the doctor, who interrupts Gene and sends Finny home.  Gene 
continues to visit Finny, eventually training for the Olympics in Finny’s place—
attempting to “become a part of Phineas.”  
 This story illustrates the central investigation of the present study—to examine 
how people respond when they cause harm to those they envy, and what they do in 
response to the harm they have caused.  Past research has demonstrated people’s 
enjoyment of seeing envied others brought down or lowered in status—a phenomenon 
referred to as ‘schadenfreude’ (Feather & Sherman, 2002; Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & 
Doosje, 2003; Smith, Turner, & Garonzik, 1996).  This reduction of the envied other’s 
status, however, was often seen in one’s mind, as opposed to in reality.  In other words, 
people may derogate envied individuals or rationalize away their superiority rather than 
cause their actual status to change.  The present study, by contrast, looked at how people 
respond once they have, in actuality, caused the other person harm.   
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 A sequence of events leads to the individual’s response to having caused harm to 
the envied other.  The catalyst of this sequence is the individual encountering an upward 
comparison—such as Gene meeting Finny.  This leads to an emotional threat —seen in 
Gene’s envy of Finny’s natural abilities and charisma—to which the individual must 
respond.  At this point, individuals could take a number of different actions in response.   
For example, they could diminish the superiority of the other in their mind or choose to 
actually cause harm to the other person.  In Gene’s case, he caused real physical harm.  
There are two main emotional responses that individuals may experience as a result of 
having succeeded in their goal of harming the envied individual.  The person may feel 
pleased about no longer having the previously envied other as an ego threat.  However, 
he or she may also feel guilt over having caused the person harm.  (Clearly, this was the 
response of Gene.)  Finally, individuals may respond to this new emotion that they are 
experiencing.  In Gene’s case, he responded to his guilt with prosocial behavior—visiting 
Finny and trying to fulfill Finny’s dreams for him.   
Derogation of Upward Comparison Targets 
 Numerous studies have examined how individuals respond to superior others.  
When confronted by an ego-threatening upward comparison, individuals can neutralize 
the threat by making it less relevant to themselves, by decreasing the closeness of the 
other, or by bringing the superior other down (Tesser & Collins, 1988).  Making the 
threat less relevant is often done in one’s own mind while decreasing closeness or 
bringing the other person down can be done either through mental rationalization or 
behavior.  
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Rationalizing the threat may involve making the focus of the threat less relevant 
to the individual’s own self-concept.  This was demonstrated by Mussweiler, Gabriel, and 
Bodenhausen (2000) who found that when outperformed by another, individuals 
emphasized those aspects that made them different from the superior other.  Specifically, 
Caucasian women, when outperformed by an Asian woman, focused more on their 
differing ethnic identities than their shared gender.   
The individual may also decrease the ego threat by decreasing the closeness 
between him or herself and the superior other.  The most obvious form of this is putting 
physical distance between the two.  However, this is also accomplished through 
increasing the superiority of the other, a phenomenon known as the genius effect.  The 
genius effect (Alicke, 1997) maintains that by making the superior other exceptionally 
amazing, the individual raises him or her to a level of expertise or proficiency to the point 
where he or she is no longer comparable.  For example, Alicke found that people 
exaggerated the abilities of others who beat them and Shepperd and Taylor (1999) 
demonstrated that individuals occasionally ascribe advantages to a target of upward 
comparison in order to make the two more dissimilar.  In this way, if the superior person 
outperforms the individual, it is possible to ascribe their worse performance to a 
difference in advantages, rather than to a lack of ability.  This is seen, for example, when 
a tennis player infers that his or her loss is due to the opponent’s better coach, more 
practice time or better racket, rather than a real difference in ability.   
Finally, when faced with a superior other, an individual has the option of actually 
decreasing the prestige of the person, or bringing that person down.  This has often been 
demonstrated as happening in the person’s mind (Gibbons & McCoy, 1991; Wills, 1981).  
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For example, Gibbons and McCoy found that individuals derogated upward comparison 
targets by rating them as less likable.  Derogation of the envied other is seen, for 
example, when the tennis player who has lost his or her match says that the other player 
may be talented in tennis, but is overweight and unsociable.   
While past research has often focused on the mental denigration of superior 
others, it is also possible for the person to be brought down in reality.  Some people may 
choose this method more often than others.  One group that has been shown to have a 
greater predisposition to bringing others down is narcissists.  Marked by their inflated 
self-views, high aggression towards threatening others, and low sense of guilt and 
empathy (Bogart, Benotsch, & Pavolic, 2004; Twenge & Campbell, 2003), narcissists 
make ideal targets for an investigation of the derogation of upward comparative targets.  
Many studies have demonstrated a tendency for narcissists to react negatively in 
threatening upward comparative situations.  For example, Morf and Rhodewalt (1993) 
provided evidence that when informed that they had been outperformed on an ego-
threatening task, narcissists rated the threatening individual negatively.   
Responses to Having Derogated an Upward Comparison Target 
Once people have succeeded in bringing harm to an envied other, they may feel 
satisfied.  They had experienced a negative emotion (that of envy or ego threat) and they 
have successfully eliminated it.  Indeed, people often experience schadenfreude: pleasure 
at the suffering of impressive others.  For example, schadenfreude might be experienced 
in response to the top student in one’s class failing a quiz or Martha Stewart being 
imprisoned.   
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Smith, Turner, and Garonzik (1996) explored the relationship between envy and 
schadenfreude.  They studied how participants responded when a superior student—the 
object of envy—suffered a setback.  They found that the more envy the participant had, 
the more schadenfreude he or she experienced.  Simply disliking the student was also 
found to predict schadenfreude.  Leach, Spears, Branscombe, and Doosje (2003) found 
that Dutch participants reported experiencing schadenfreude upon hearing about a 
German loss in soccer.  The more interest the participant had in soccer and the more 
threatened he or she felt by Dutch inferiority, the more schadenfreude he or she 
experienced.  They measured schadenfreude by having participants rate themselves on 
emotional terms, such as happiness and satisfaction.  Smith, Parrott, and Diener (1999) 
also found that dispositional envy predicted the amount of schadenfreude participants felt 
after negative feedback from an advantaged other.     
An alternative possible response to having caused the person harm would be guilt 
(instead of satisfaction).  Instead of feeling happy about his or her success in eliminating 
the ego threat, the person has now replaced envy with guilt.  It is possible that the 
offender who feels guilt will engage in prosocial behavior in order to relieve it (e.g., 
Baumeister, Heatherton, & Stillwell, 1994; Lindsey, 2005).  
Some people are less likely to experience guilt than others.  Those people who are 
most likely to experience guilt are those who also experience empathy (Ferguson, Stegge, 
Miller, & Olsen, 1999).  Narcissists are recognized for both their lack of guilt and 
empathy (Watson, Grisham, Trotter, & Biderman, 1984).  Watson and Morris (1991) also 
found that empathy negatively correlated with the exploitativeness and entitlement 
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dimensions of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Hall & Raskin, 1979)1.  
Similarly, Montebarroci, Surcinelli, Baldaro, Trombini, and Rossi (2004) found a 
negative correlation between and narcissism and guilt.   
Present Study  
In past studies, one of the key elements in the examination of schadenfreude is 
that the person has had no role in the downfall of the envied other (Leach et al., 2003).  
However, a response of happiness versus guilt would likely vary depending on whether 
the person had played a large or small role in causing the misfortune—an aspect that has 
never before been investigated.  The present study examined how the influence of playing 
a large or small role in bringing down a superior other affected participants’ ability to 
experience schadenfreude versus guilt.  We expected that playing a significant role in the 
misfortune of the other would lead to less schadenfreude and more guilt, primarily for 
those who are low in narcissism.  Narcissists, we predicted, would feel a higher level of 
schadenfreude and less guilt than would nonnarcissists, despite their role in the downfall. 
One of the key goals of this study was to examine the relationship of narcissism to 
schadenfreude.  No previous research has examined the relationship between these 
factors.  Past research has shown that narcissists experience less empathy and aggress 
more towards superior others than do less narcissistic individuals.  Therefore, we 
predicted that narcissists would experience more schadenfreude and less guilt after 
bringing harm to the applicant than non-narcissists.  We also expected narcissists to have 
                                                 
1 The NPI is a 40-item measurement that can be subdivided into seven subscales; 
Authority, Exhibitionism, Superiority, Vanity, Exploitativeness, Entitlement, and Self-
Sufficiency (Raskin & Terry, 1988).
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lower levels of prosocial behavior in response to having caused harm than non-
narcissists, due to their lower guilt.  
The study presented participants with an exceptional job applicant and gave them 
an opportunity to evaluate the applicant.  Depending on experiment condition, the 
participants were told that their decisions would be very influential or not on this 
applicant’s chances of being hired.  The participants were then informed that their rating 
of the applicant was negative in comparison with other evaluations, and would likely hurt 
the applicant’s ability to get the job.  We examined their levels of schadenfreude and guilt 
after they had learned of their harmful effect on the applicant.  Finally, we gave them the 
opportunity to rate the applicant again and tested subsequent prosocial behavior indicated 
by way of an enhanced evaluation of the applicant.   
Method 
Participants 
The participants consisted of 66 female undergraduate students enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course.  The upward comparison target in our study was female, 
and we chose to run only female participants because male participants could not easily 
be recruited and we wanted to use a same-sex comparison target.  The total number of 
participants does not include fourteen participants who were eliminated from analyses.  
Four of these 14 participants were eliminated either because of computer malfunctions or 
because they reported to the experimenter that they had misunderstood instructions.  Five 
participants were eliminated because they correctly guessed the hypothesis of the study.  
Five participants were eliminated for scoring the applicant so highly that their evaluation 
could not conceivably have negatively affected the applicant.  (On a scale of 0-100, all 
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scores at 90 and above were eliminated.)  Students received class credit for their 
participation in the study.  
Materials and Procedure  
First Questionnaire. Participants first filled out a questionnaire, which examined 
the participant’s levels of narcissism and self-esteem using the NPI (M= 15.65, SD= 7.53; 
Cronbach’s alpha= .87) and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (M= 52.35, SD= 9.65; 
Cronbach’s alpha= .85; RSE; Rosenberg, 1965).    
Cover Story. Once participants had completed the first questionnaire, the cover 
story was explained.  They were informed that each psychology lab at their university 
had one student lab manager—a competitive and prestigious position—and a number of 
lab assistants.  These positions, the experimenter explained, are open to psychology 
majors who apply for them.  In the previous year, this particular lab had ostensibly run a 
study during the time that they were hiring students.  The study had looked at the 
influence of different factors on evaluations of applicants.  Because the study was a 
success, a new study was being conducted again this year.  Participants were told that this 
year's study was designed to test how people form first impressions based on descriptive 
information.  The second purpose of the study was ostensibly to make better hiring 
decisions by using the educated evaluations of students.  The experimenter explained that 
the participants were going to evaluate one of the applicants for the job and that their 
evaluations would later be taken into consideration during the hiring process because the 
participants had not met the applicant and were, therefore, theoretically less biased.    
Experiment Conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to either the high 
responsibility or low responsibility conditions.  In the high responsibility condition, 
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participants learned that they were one of only two participants whose evaluations would 
be considered in hiring the applicant.  In the low responsibility condition, participants 
were told that they were just one of thirty participants whose evaluations would be 
considered.  This allowed us to manipulate the level of responsibility participants felt 
they had over the applicant’s likelihood of being hired.  In other words, the participant 
was told that she was going to have either a very influential effect or a less important 
effect on the applicant.   
Lab Manager Evaluation. Once the premise of the study had been explained, the 
participant was given an application and recommendation letter of an applicant to review 
(See Appendixes A and B for full set of materials).  The application had been filled out 
before the experiment began, allegedly by the applicant.  The application consisted of 19 
responses to questions that inquired about such things as the student’s academic 
performance, athletic ability, and leadership skills.  The answers to the application 
questions revealed that the applicant excelled in all three of these domains.  A photocopy 
of a fake student identification card was also attached to the application in order to 
present the applicant as an attractive female.  The applicant was made attractive and 
athletic in order to prevent the participants from decreasing the threat of the applicant by 
concluding that she was a stereotypical “nerd.”  The recommendation letter, supposedly 
written by a psychology professor, was positive except for one brief criticism of the 
applicant’s sensitivity in leading people.  The participant was also given an audio 
recording of an interview with the applicant, which was a one-minute audio clip from an 
interview with the applicant that presented the applicant as self-assured and successful, 
although a bit arrogant.  We included an audio clip as part of the evaluation in order to 
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give participants an ambiguous source of information about the applicant that they could 
interpret in different ways.  This, along with making the applicant slightly arrogant and 
including a critique in the recommendation letter, was done in order to avoid ceiling 
effects in the evaluations of the applicant.  It was expected that less narcissistic 
individuals would rate the applicant more positively, despite the arrogance, while 
narcissists would use the applicants' arrogance as an excuse to negatively rate her. 
After taking a few moments to review the application, read the recommendation 
letter, and listen to the interview clip, the participant completed an evaluation of the 
applicant (See Appendix C).  This evaluation allowed the participant to rate the applicant 
on 13 different positive characteristics such as kindness, patience, and dependability.  At 
the end of the evaluation, participants were asked two questions regarding whether the 
professor should hire the applicant and whether the participant would hire the applicant.  
These two questions were answered on a 100-point scale (participants were told that 50 
and above was a positive evaluation and 70 represented “outstanding") and were 
explained to be the most influential questions on the evaluation.  The endpoints on the 
100-point scale were not defined in order to avoid ceiling effects in participant 
evaluations.  The score of 70 was defined as “outstanding” to give participants more 
freedom in what scores could be viewed as positive versus exceptionally positive, and to 
avoid having participants view the 100-point scale as a standard grading range, such as 
90-100 being an A.  In this way, we could make participants believe that their evaluation 
of the applicant was average in comparison to other evaluations and, as a result, harmful.  
Second Questionnaire. Once the lab manager evaluation was completed, the 
applicant filled out a second questionnaire (See Appendix D).  This questionnaire was 
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explained to have no influence on the applicant's chances of being hired—it was simply 
being used to further investigate the participant’s views of the applicant.  The 
questionnaire examined how much the participant liked the applicant, felt threatened by 
the applicant, and felt envious of the applicant.  The questionnaire also gauged the 
participant's levels of guilt, responsibility and schadenfreude.   
Halfway through the questionnaire, participants were informed that, in 
comparison to other evaluations by past students, they had given the applicant a negative 
evaluation.  Those applicants who were hired last year (they were told) received an 
average score of 96 out of 100 on these two questions.  Participants who had given the 
applicant a score lower than 96, therefore, could conclude that their score, in comparison, 
was negative and could cause the applicant to lose the job.  Following this, a 
questionnaire again recorded participants' emotional states, such as feelings of happiness, 
guilt, and responsibility.  
Lab Assistant Evaluation. Finally, the participant filled out a second evaluation of 
the applicant, this time for the position of lab assistant (See Appendix E).  This 
evaluation was almost identical to the first one, consisting of 46 questions that allowed 
the participant to rate the applicant on a number of different qualities, and ended with two 
questions about whether or not the applicant should be hired.  These questions were 
presented as being the most influential part of their evaluation.  This evaluation would be 
used (they were told) if the applicant did not have a high enough score to qualify for lab 
manager.  It was (in reality) compared to the first evaluation to see if the applicant had 
changed her view of the applicant due to guilt at giving her a negative evaluation.  
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Prosocial behavior was operationally defined as the difference between the second 
evaluations' scores and the first evaluations' scores. 
Operational Definitions. A measure of overall envy of the applicant was created 
by combining participants' self-reported envy of the applicant both before and after 
learning of their negative effect on the applicant (Cronbach's alpha= .69).  Schadenfreude 
was operationally defined as a combination of four measurements.   These measurements 
consisted of participants’ self-reported levels of feeling “happy,” “good,” “satisfied,” and 
“sad” and were taken directly after participants learned of their negative effect on the 
applicant (Cronbach’s alpha= .73).   
Summary of Design. The primary between-subjects factors were responsibility 
and narcissism2 and the main dependent variables were reported levels of schadenfreude, 
envy, and guilt, and the evaluation scores.  We predicted that narcissists would 
experience more schadenfreude, more envy, and less guilt than less narcissistic 
individuals, regardless of their level of responsibility.  Less narcissistic individuals, in 
contrast, were expected to be highly influenced by the responsibility manipulation.  As 
opposed to narcissists, they should experience a moderate amount of schadenfreude and 
less guilt when low in responsibility, but their schadenfreude would be replaced by guilt 
when they were in the high responsibility condition.   
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The “narcissists” examined in this study are narcissistic according to the Narcissism Personality 
Inventory.  In other words, they had relatively high levels of narcissism compared with other participants 
sampled.  Clearly the narcissists we studied are found in a normal population and are not likely to have 
symptoms as extreme as those shown by individuals with narcissistic personality disorder. 
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Results 
Manipulation Checks 
A manipulation check verified that most participants remembered that hired 
applicants from the year before had received an average score of 96, with 57 of the 66 
participants (86%) remembering the exact score.  Participants’ recall of their own 
evaluation scores was also strongly correlated with the actual scores that they gave the 
applicant, r(64)= .69, p <.001.  Although only 27 of the 66 participants (41%) 
remembered their score exactly, 50 of the 66 participants’ estimates of their own 
evaluation scores were only five or fewer away from of their actual score (Mdiff= 4.07, 
SD= 10.47).   
Those participants in the high responsibility condition reported feeling slightly 
more responsibility (M= 4.84, SD= 2.07) than participants in the low responsibility 
condition (M= 4.17, SD= 2.74), but this difference was not statistically significant, t(64)= 
1.11, ns.  This suggests that either participants did not take note of how many other 
participants were evaluating the applicant besides them, or that they did but another 
factor determined the extent to which they felt personal responsibility.  
 An examination of the means for the NPI revealed an unequal distribution of 
narcissists between the two responsibility conditions.  Although participants were 
randomly assigned to conditions, by chance somewhat higher levels of narcissism were 
found in the high responsibility condition (M= 17.06, SD= 7.55), compared with the low 
responsibility condition (M= 14.40, SD= 7.41), t(64)= 1.71, p= .09.  
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Effects of Responsibility Manipulation  
We hypothesized that participants’ level of responsibility for the applicant’s 
reduced likelihood of being hired for the job would affect participants’ levels of 
schadenfreude, their prosocial behavior, and their reported guilt.  However, we found no 
evidence to support this.  A 2 (responsibility: high or low) x 2 (narcissism: high or low) 
ANOVA3 was conducted for each of the dependent variables.  The responsibility 
manipulation did not significantly affect any of the dependent variables, either by itself or 
as part of an interaction.  Covarying out self-esteem did not change these findings.  As a 
result, none of the following analyses described will involve the responsibility 
manipulation.      
Schadenfreude 
One of the key goals of this study was to examine the extent to which narcissists 
felt schadenfreude.  A correlational analysis revealed a significant relationship between 
narcissism and schadenfreude, with narcissists experiencing more schadenfreude than 
those lower in narcissism, r(64)=  .29, p= .02.  This effect existed even when covarying 
out self-esteem, confirming that it was narcissism, and not self-esteem, which was 
responsible for this effect.  This finding supports our hypothesis that narcissists 
experience more schadenfreude at the setbacks of others than less narcissistic individuals.  
Self-esteem alone was not significantly related to schadenfreude, r(64)= .15, p= .22. 
We expected that those participants with less guilt and more envy of the applicant 
would experience more schadenfreude.  These predictions were generally supported.  
Participants who felt more schadenfreude also felt more envy of the participant, r(64)= 
                                                 
3 ANOVAs used to examine interactions used a median split for narcissism.  When interactions were not 
examined, as with correlational analyses, no median split was used.   
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.34, p= .01, and marginally less guilt after learning of their negative effect on the 
applicant, r(64)= -.21, p= .09.   
Evaluation Scores 
We predicted that narcissists would evaluate applicants more negatively than less 
narcissistic individuals, but found no support for this prediction.  Narcissists were 
actually slightly more likely to recommend hiring the applicant, r(64)= .22, p= .07.  
Although not significant, this relationship was in the opposite direction than was 
expected.  Narcissists were slightly more likely to evaluate the applicant more positively 
for the lab manager position, r(64)= .21, p= .10.  This relationship was even stronger 
when isolating two components of the NPI.  Applicant evaluations were positively 
correlated with the subscales of superiority, r(64)= .33, p= .01, and vanity, r(64)= .37, p= 
.002.  
A similar trend was found for the second evaluation of the applicant (for the 
position of lab assistant).  Although narcissism in general was not significantly related to 
a more positive evaluation on the second evaluation, r(64)= .15, p= .24, the same sub-
components of the NPI were significantly related to giving a more positive evaluation.  
Specifically, evaluations for the second evaluation (for the lab assistant position) were 
positively related to the subscales of superiority, r(64)= .32, p= .01, and vanity, r(64)= 
.33, p= .01.  As before, these findings were not in the expected direction.  The 
relationships between the subscales of superiority and vanity and both evaluations existed 
even when covarying for self-esteem. 
Narcissism was expected to be negatively related to prosocial behavior.  In other 
words, narcissists were expected to exhibit smaller increases in their evaluation scores 
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from the first evaluation to the second compared with participants lower in narcissism.  A 
2 (narcissism: high or low) x 2 (evaluation scores: pre and post) mixed-design ANOVA 
found no statistically reliable relationship between narcissism and prosocial behavior, 
F(1,64)= 2.03, p= .16.  This relationship was not changed when covarying for guilt, 
although a moderate relationship was found between prosocial behavior and guilt, r(64)= 
.24, p= .06.  Overall, participants rated the applicant more positively on the second 
evaluation for lab assistant, (M= 83.37, SD= 15.52), than on the first evaluation for lab 
manager (M= 73.72, SD= 12.76), F(1,64)= 53.07, p < .001.  This indicates that either 
participants, narcissists and nonnarcissists alike, exhibited prosocial behavior after 
learning of their negative impact on the applicant, or they rated the applicant more 
positively due to the differences between the position of lab manager and lab assistant. 
Interestingly, despite their more positive evaluations of the applicant, narcissists 
were more likely than nonnarcissists to indicate belief in their superiority over the 
applicant, r(64)= .35, p= .004.  This finding is consistent with past research indicating 
that narcissists are arrogant.  
Guilt and Envy 
Past research has found that narcissists are less prone to guilt.  Narcissism was 
negatively, though not significantly, correlated with guilt levels before participants found 
out about their negative effect on the applicant, r(64)= -.21, p= .09.  Covarying for self-
esteem eliminated this effect, r(63)= .004, ns.  Narcissism was also negatively correlated 
with guilt levels after participants learned of their negative effect on the applicant, 
although this relationship was less powerful, r(64)= -.13, p= .30.  Covarying for self-
esteem again made this relationship less powerful and even changed the direction of the 
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effect, r(63)= .08, ns.  A 2 (narcissism: high or low) x 2 (guilt: pre and post) mixed-
design ANOVA revealed a significant increase in guilt levels for all participants from 
before (M= 3.11, SD= 2.10) to after (M= 4.55, SD= 2.35) learning of their negative effect 
on the applicant, F(1,64)= 24.88, p <.001.  The magnitude of change for guilt was no 
different for high or low narcissists, F(1, 64)= 0.13, ns.   
Self-esteem, however, was negatively correlated with levels of guilt both before, 
r(64)= -.41, p= .001, and after, r(64)= -.37, p= .003, participants learned of their negative 
effect on the applicant.  These effects were fundamentally unchanged when narcissism 
was covaried.  A 2 (self-esteem: high or low) x 2 (guilt: pre and post) mixed-design 
ANOVA revealed that, overall, participants showed more guilt after learning of their 
negative effect on the applicant than before, F(1,64)= 25.13, p <.001.  The magnitude of 
guilt change, however, was unrelated to self-esteem, F(1,64)= 0.31, ns.  Covarying for 
narcissism also did not significantly change the relationship between narcissism and guilt 
either before or after participants learned of their negative effect.  This suggests a 
stronger relationship between self-esteem and guilt than narcissism and guilt. 
Narcissism was related to dispositional envy, r(64)= -.31, p= .01, with narcissists 
reporting fewer experiences of envy in their everyday lives.  Narcissism was not, 
however, correlated with envy of the applicant, r(64)= -.02, ns.  Overall, envy of the 
applicant was positively related to higher levels of guilt both before participants learned 
of their negative impact on the applicant, r(64)= .57, p <.001, and afterwards, r(64)= .30, 
p= .01.  This finding suggests that being more envious of the applicant is related to a 
higher level of guilt in general, even before one is informed of their negative effect on 
another person.  See Table 1 for a summary of relevant results.   
 18
  
             
Table 1 
Summary of Results       ___    
 
Dependent Variables  Low Narcissism High Narcissism Correlation  
Schadenfreude  M= 3.82   M= 4.67  r(64)= .29, 
SD= 1.39  SD= 1.70  p= .02 
 
Guilt    M= 4.60   M= 4.48  r(64)= -.13, 
    SD= 2.63  SD= 2.03  p= .30 
 
Envy of Applicant  M= 4.10   M= 4.15  r(64)= -.02, 
    SD= 1.97  SD= 1.77  p= .90 
 
Dispositional Envy  M= 29.57  M= 23.16  r(64)= -.31, 
    SD= 11.90  SD= 9.98  p= .01 
     
Evaluation Scores  M= 71.89   M= 75.79   r(64)=  .21, 
    SD= 13.00  SD= 12.36  p= .10 
 
Prosocial Behavior  M= 9.01   M= 10.37  r(64)= -.04, 
    SD= 11.70  SD= 9.65  p= .78 
 
Belief in Superiority  M= 2.77  M= 3.52  r(64)=  .35,  
    SD= 1.54  SD= 1.98  p= .004 
             
Note.  A median split of narcissism was used for the means and standard deviations.  The correlations did 
not use a median split for narcissism. 
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Additional analyses revealed that envy was related to reported suspicion of the 
study.  The debriefing of participants revealed that some participants reported suspicion 
of the study’s authenticity.  A variable was created based on debriefing responses and  
comments that ranked participants on their level of suspicion (No Suspicion [n= 28], Low 
Suspicion [n= 28], High Suspicion [n= 15].  Note that the High Suspicion category 
excludes the five participants described earlier who correctly guessed the purpose of the 
study and thus were excluded from all analyses.  For example, if the participant 
hypothesized that a key element of the study was whether or not he or she would feel 
happy about seeing such an impressive applicant fail and change their evaluations as a 
result, we eliminated that participant from all analyses.  If the participant was suspicious 
that the applicant had been created but was not certain, we did not eliminate her, but 
instead placed her in the High Suspicion category.  Suspicion was positively correlated 
with initial envy of the applicant, r(64)= .34, p= .01, and did not depend on narcissism or 
self-esteem.  This suggests that envy of the applicant motivated participants’ disbelief in 
such an outstanding applicant’s existence, perhaps to protect themselves from ego threat.   
Discussion 
 One of the main hypotheses of this study was that narcissists would experience 
more schadenfreude than less narcissistic individuals.  The results of this study support 
this hypothesis.  Narcissists reported significantly more schadenfreude than less 
narcissistic individuals after learning that they had negatively affected the applicant.  This 
effect was not related to self-esteem, which suggests that it is narcissism, and not self-
esteem, which drives this relationship.   
 20
  
There were no main effects or interactions involving the manipulation of the 
responsibility the participant had for the applicant not getting the job.  This may indicate 
that being very influential in the downfall of the envied other makes no difference in 
one’s levels of schadenfreude or guilt, or this may just be an indication of a weak 
manipulation.  The manipulation check was not successful in demonstrating participants’ 
differing sense of responsibility. The responsibility manipulation was designed in this 
way because a pilot study suggested that the responsibility manipulation was too strong.  
The original manipulation told participants that their evaluation alone had caused the 
applicant to lose the job or that another participant’s evaluation had caused the applicant 
to lose the job.  In the pilot study, participants appeared to disbelieve their strong role in 
the hiring process, and the manipulation was changed as a result.  It is possible, however, 
that this change made the manipulation too weak, causing some participants to be 
unaware of the negative effect that they had on the applicant.   
One of the most surprising results was that narcissists actually evaluated the 
applicants more positively than less narcissistic participants on both evaluations.  This 
was contrary to what was expected, as past research has indicated aggression of 
narcissists towards superior others (Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993).  One possible explanation 
for this relates to the personality of the applicant.  The applicant was made slightly 
arrogant in order to avoid ceiling effects in participant evaluations.  It is possible that one 
unforeseen side effect of the applicant’s arrogance was to endear the applicant to 
narcissists more than to participants lower in narcissism.  Narcissists are typically 
arrogant themselves and may, therefore, not have been as repulsed by the applicant’s 
arrogant tendencies.  Due to their arrogance, they may have viewed the arrogance of the 
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applicant as a sign of a confident and qualified leader.  Past research has demonstrated 
that individuals are more attracted to others who are similar to them (Kupersmidt, 
DeRosier, & Patterson, 1995; Newcomb, 1961).   
Narcissists, however, were significantly more likely than nonnarcissists to rate 
themselves as superior to the applicant and more qualified for the position of lab 
manager.  This supports the assumption of narcissists’ arrogance.  It could even be 
concluded that narcissists did not experience an ego threat from the applicant or they 
would have derogated the applicant.  It is possible that narcissists were able to recognize 
the excellence of the applicant, but were not threatened by her due to their strong belief 
that they were, nevertheless, superior to the applicant.  
 Narcissists reported significantly lower levels of dispositional envy, but not 
significantly less envy of the applicant.  This may indicate a sensitivity in the extensively 
validated 8-item measure of dispositional envy that was not matched by the 3-item 
measure of envy of the applicant created for this study.  The fact that narcissists rated the 
applicant more positively than nonnarcissists suggests that they were not envious of the 
applicant.   
Narcissism was expected to relate to a number of different variables with which it 
had no relationship.  For example, narcissism was not significantly related to prosocial 
behavior.  In fact, all participants significantly increased their scores of the applicant 
during the second evaluation, regardless of their narcissistic tendencies or the level of 
their responsibility.  It is possible that all participants rated applicants more highly the 
second time due to the less demanding qualifications needed for the position of lab 
assistant.  A relationship was found, however, between prosocial behavior and guilt.  This 
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suggests that it was the relationship between guilt and prosocial behavior that led to a 
higher evaluation the second time, rather than the different demands of the job.   
Schadenfreude was correlated with less guilt and more envy of the applicant.  
This suggests that, in order for participants to be free to experience schadenfreude, they 
may require lower levels of guilt, as more guilt would take away their ability to enjoy the 
applicant’s setback.  Envy was linked to lower levels of guilt.  This suggests that when 
participants were envious enough of the applicant they may have ignored any tendencies 
they had to feel guilt due to the extent of their envy.   
Self-esteem was also shown to be an indicator of guilt levels.  Those participants 
with high self-esteem were found to experience less guilt than those with lower self-
esteem.  As mentioned before, this effect was not found for narcissism and guilt.  This 
suggests that an individuals’ degree of self-esteem, as opposed to narcissism, is related to 
their experience of guilt.  
 Unexpectedly, a correlation was found between suspicion of the study during the 
debriefing and envy of the applicant.  Those participants who reported more suspicion 
over the hypothesis of the experiment or the genuineness of the applicant were found to 
also be more envious of the applicant.  It is possible that envy of the applicant, and a wish 
to believe that such an applicant does not really exist, motivated participants’ suspicion of 
the authenticity of the applicant and the study in general.   
Limitations  
A number of limitations in this study may account for some of the unexpected 
results.  First, the responsibility manipulation may not have been sufficiently strong.  As 
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discussed earlier, the strength of the study’s manipulation was decreased in order to 
increase its believability.  This may have made the manipulation too weak, however.  
Second, narcissism levels were not equally distributed amongst the different 
conditions of the study.  Specifically, although participants were randomly assigned to 
conditions, more high narcissists were in the high responsibility condition, and more low 
narcissists were in the low responsibility condition. This occurrence may have affected 
the results of the study.   
Third, it cannot be guaranteed that participants were, in fact, threatened by the 
applicant.  Although debriefing results suggest that most participants were impressed by 
the applicant’s qualifications and impressive resume, it is possible that participants lacked 
sufficient feelings of envy and inferiority.  This is a difficult phenomenon to test, 
however, since people are not often willing to report when they experience an ego threat.   
Fourth, the evident arrogance of the applicant may have influenced results with 
regard to participants’ scores of the applicants.  Not only might narcissists not be as 
repelled by this trait, but this is an adequate reason to suggest that an applicant not be 
hired.  In other words, it is possible that logical concerns about arrogance, as opposed to 
envy, would lead participants to give negative evaluations.  For these reasons, another 
manipulation aimed at managing ceiling effects might be more effective.   
Finally, due to the design of the study, only females were allowed to participate.  
This eliminates the possibility of generalizing these results to males as well as females.  
Future studies would benefit from a study design that includes both males and females.   
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Future research is needed to verify and further investigate the relationships 
between the variables of interest.  Nevertheless, this study has provided new information 
with regard to narcissism and schadenfreude.  Although the role of responsibility did not 
affect schadenfreude, guilt, or prosocial behavior in this study, responsibility may still 
play a role in this relationship.  Future study is needed to fully uncover those 
relationships.  For now, this study has provided a better understanding of how individuals 
react towards threatening others, and how they respond to having caused harm.   
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